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The findings of the existing literature on the relationship between employment protection 
legislation and the unemployment rate are mixed. This study analyzes the relationship between 
employment protection legislation measured by the OECD Employment Protection Index and the 
unemployment rate between 2001 and 2008. After controlling country fixed effects, I find that 
more stringent employment protection legislation may not be a significant factor for higher a 
unemployment rate. The estimated model included output gap, government size, openness of the 
economy, real minimum wages, urbanization rate, population density, population, unemployment 
benefit generosity, and tax wedge as explanatory variables. I find that the output gap, as a 
measure of business cycle, and government size are significant factors determining the 
unemployment rate in selected 15 OECD countries. These findings suggest that employment 
protection legislation, especially in developed countries, may not be affective policy instrument 
for policy makers when combating unemployment. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The substantial rise in the unemployment rates during the Great Recession has revived 
the interest in analyzing the determinants of the unemployment rate in advanced economies.
1
 The 
Great Recession, which started in 2007, has had dramatic impacts on labor markets around the 
world. The crisis originally emerged in the United States (U.S) and had a global impact through 
the channels of trade and financial flows. As a result of this global downturn in economic 
activity, unemployment rates in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries reached a high of 8.2 percent in 2009 up from 5.7 percent in 2007.
2
 To solve 
the unemployment problem in these advanced economies, demand side policies, supply side 
policies, and labor market institutions have been discussed extensively. Since the 1990s, 
reducing labor market rigidities, in other words, increasing labor market flexibility, has been 
recommended as a policy instrument to reduce the unemployment rate. The 1994 Jobs Study of 
OECD triggered a discussion that strict labor market institutions were the main cause for the 
high unemployment rate in advanced economies (Freeman, 2005).  However, there are different 
findings on the impact of labor market institutions on unemployment. In this study, the 
relationship between labor market protection legislation and unemployment rate in 15 OECD 
countries is analyzed for the 2001-2008 period. The dataset used in the analysis is built by 
gathering information from various sources, including the OECD statistical database, World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank and World Economic Outlook database of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
                                                 
1
 For example, in 2012, the IMF organized the Thirteen Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference on the Labor 
Markets with the perspective of the Great Recession. Also, the 2013 World Development Report of the World Bank 
focuses on jobs.  
2
 OECD Economic Outlook, September 2012. 
2 
 
The Great Recession, as Ohanian (2010) highlights, was different from any other crises in 
the history of the U.S. and from the recent recessions in high-income OECD countries like 
Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The significant decline in the 
U.S. output during the Great Recession mainly resulted from a higher decline in employment 
rather than productivity loss compared to other crises in U.S. history and the recent recession in 
high-income OECD countries. Ohanian (2010) points to more rigid labor markets in European 
countries as a plausible explanation for the variation in the unemployment rate of the Great 
Recession between the U.S. and Europe. This study provides evidence as to whether the 
unemployment rate can be influenced from the rigidity of the labor market measured by the 
employment protection index (EPI). The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Recent 
trends in the employment protection index and unemployment rates in 15 selected OECD 
countries are presented in the next section. The third section reviews the existing literature on the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and labor market institutions specifically 
employment protection legislations. The fourth section describes the econometric model 
estimated in this study. The fifth section describes the data and descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the model. The sixth section presents the regression results with interpretations.  
The last section concludes. 
II. Recent Trends in Employment Protection and Unemployment Rates in OECD 
Countries 
 
Policy choice of different options of labor market regulations leads to different labor 
market outcomes for a given country. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), which also is 
known as job security legislation, is a type of labor market regulation. EPL can be defined as the 
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rules regulating the initiation, or the termination of employment contracts. EPL not only ensures 
employment protection by limiting firms’ ability to hire new workers without job security 
requirements, but also makes dismissal costly for firms to protect currently employed workers 
(Betcherman, 2013). EPL is used as a tool, like many other labor market regulations, to enhance 
the welfare of workers by reducing the risk of unemployment and increase employment 
conditions (OECD, 2004).    
Heckman & Pages-Serra (2000) provide a theoretical framework for the impact of 
employment protection on employment rates. According to this framework, firms have three 
optimal policy responses to shocks: (a) firing workers, (b) hiring workers, or (c) doing nothing. 
In the case of a negative shock and a decline in the marginal productivity of a worker, firms may 
fire workers. However, firms can be discouraged due to the existence of high mandatory 
dismissal costs. Therefore, the number of dismissals would be lower in this case compared to the 
case where firing costs are small. Economic expansion and higher worker productivity encourage 
firms to hire more workers; however, firms hire fewer workers to avoid future dismissal costs in 
case of an economic downturn. Therefore, the employment rate is expected to be lower during 
expansionary periods and higher during the downturns when stricter employment protection 
legislation is present. Stricter EPL is found to reduce turnover rates (Heckman & Pages-Serra, 
2000). In summary, while more rigid labor market regulations would reduce firms’ speed of 
adjustment to shocks, more flexible labor regulations would cause excessive layoffs during 
economic downturns. Furthermore, workers under flexible labor market regulations would be 
more likely to face income shocks and loss of benefits (health and social security) as a result of 
arbitrary dismissals (Venn, 2009). Reducing labor market rigidities in the OECD countries has 
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been widely considered as a policy option to reduce the unemployment rate. However, the 
findings on the impact of labor market institutions on unemployment are mixed. For example, 
Nickel & Layard (1999) and Bassani & Duval (2009) find no evidence of a relationship between 
stricter a labor market and a high unemployment rate. On the other hand, Bernal-Verdugo, 
Furceri and Guillaumel (2012) find that more flexible labor markets improve labor market 
outcomes by reducing overall unemployment, youth unemployment, and long-term 
unemployment. This study contributes to labor market policy discussion by using a most up-to-
date employment protection and economic data for the selected OECD countries. 
Developments in EPI and the Unemployment Rate in OECD 
The economies of the selected OECD countries grew during the time period analyzed in 
this study. In 2008, the impact of the great recession started to influence the OECD countries as 
nearly no economic growth was observed in that year.
3
 In terms of regulatory tendencies, a major 
trend in the OECD countries, over 2001-2008, is to relax employment protections in countries 
where employment protection is more strict. Overall the average unemployment rate of OECD 
countries analyzed in the study declined from about 7.1 percent in 2001 to slightly above 6.1 
percent in 2008 (Figure 1). The employment protection index also decreased from 2 in 2000 to 
1.85 in 2008.
4
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 Total GDP of OECD countries (the US $, constant prices, constant PPPs) increased by 0.2 percent in 2008 (OECD, 
2012a). 
4
 OECD EPI increases as hiring and firing conditions become more rigid and it changes between 0 and 6. EPI 
becomes stricter as employment protection index increases. 
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Figure 1: Overall Average Unemployment Rate (%) and Average EPI for the Selected 
OECD Countries between 2001 and 2008 
 
Source: OECD Employment and Labor Statistics (OECD 2012b) and OECD Indicator of 
Employment Protection (OECD 2012c), and author’s calculation. 
 
  
The employment protection index created by the OECD shows that there is considerable 
variation among OECD members in 2008 (see Table A1 in appendices). The U.S. has the most 
flexible labor market with the lowest score of an employment protection index, and Turkey has 
the highest score of the employment protection index. 
In general, across the selected OECD countries, I observe a trend towards reducing 
employment protection, especially in countries with a high employment protection index. On the 
other hand, Ireland and the U.K. had more flexible labor market conditions to start with in 2001, 
but changed their labor market policies toward stricter employment protection legislation. 
Belgium, Canada, Japan, and the U.S. kept their policies about the same. Figure 2 shows the 
changes of the employment protection legislation measured by the employment protection index 
between 2001 and 2008. 
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Figure 2: Developments in the Employment Protection Index in Selected OECD Countries 
 
     Source: OECD Indicator of Employment Protection (OECD 2012c), and author’s calculation 
 
III. Literature Review 
While some studies, in the literature, find positive association between employment 
protection and unemployment rate; others argue that such relationship is not significant. Hiring 
and firing difficulties generally are used as proxy for employment protection.
5
 In this section, 
studies on labor market institutions, especially employment protection legislations, are reviewed 
with respect to their impact on labor market outcomes, specifically unemployment rates. 
Lazear (1990) analyzes the impact of the severance pay requirements on the employment-
to-population ratio using a pooled time-series and cross section data for 22 countries over a 29-
year period. The study finds that changing the mandatory severance pay requirement from “no 
                                                 
5
 For example, Lazaer (1990) used severance pay as job security measure. 
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obligation” to “3-month advance notice” reduces the employment. Lazear (1990) also argues that 
while mandatory severance pay would increase unemployment by putting additional burden on 
employers, employers would substitute full-time workers with part-time and temporary workers.  
Siebert (1997), by investigating institutional factors in the European countries, argues 
that reforming the key labor market institutions to have more flexible labor markets would solve 
unemployment problems in Europe. Similarly, Blanchard & Wolfers (2000) suggest that more 
strict labor market institutions are a determinant for high unemployment rates, especially in 
European countries.   
Some studies focus on the impact of policy change for individual country. For example, 
Kugler (1999) analyzes the impact of dismissal costs reduction on worker turnover in Colombia 
following the labor market reform that occurred in 1990. She finds that a net decrease in 
unemployment due to increase in the hazard rates into and out of unemployment in the formal 
sector in comparison to the informal sector. Kugler (2000) builds a model in which stricter job 
security regulations lead to incentives to operate in informal sector for high-turnover firms. In 
this study, an informality impact of the EPL legislation is not analyzed. Di Tella & MacCulloch 
(2005), using a survey dataset capturing hiring and firing restrictions for 21 OECD countries 
over the period 1984-1990, find that a more flexible labor market increases both the employment 
rate and labor force participation. The labor market flexibility data in this study is taken from the 
World Competitiveness Report, and it is measured according to the opinion of the higher level of 
managers in the firms. Managers are asked the degree of companies’ flexibility for adjusting job 
security and payments under different economic realities.   The most important control variable 
in their model is the unemployment benefit generosity. They also include a control for 
8 
 
employment taxes and its interaction with flexibility and unemployment benefits. Employment 
taxes are measured as the share of total tax payment of employer in total payment to employees. 
They find that higher employment taxes lead to lower employment rates. Change in GDP is used 
to control the state of the business cycle, and this does not influence the relationship between 
flexibility and the employment rate. Bassanin & Duval (2006) analyzed the relationship between 
EPL and aggregate unemployment rates, and they find significant impact of EPL on aggregate 
unemployment rates. Bernal-Verdugo et al., (2012) finds that more flexible labor markets 
improve labor market outcomes (overall unemployment, youth unemployment and long-term 
unemployment). They use a composite labor market flexibility indicator from the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom, and it includes minimum wage, hiring and firing regulation, 
centralized collective bargaining, mandated cost of hiring, mandated cost of work dismissal and 
conscription. 
Not all studies agree on the direction of and the degree to which EPL affects 
unemployment rates. For example, Bentolila & Berola (1990) find that firing costs have larger 
impacts on firms to fire rather than hire. Therefore, an unexpected decline in firing costs could 
increase a firm’s willingness to hire new employees insignificantly. Addison and Grosso (1996) 
find little impact of severance pay on unemployment. A theoretical model by Bertola et al. 
(1999) predicts that stricter EPL leads to more stable employment since it diminishes both hiring 
and firing. Nickell (1997), in an analysis of the determinants of the unemployment in 20 OECD 
countries, highlights certain labor market features to explain high unemployment. A generous 
unemployment benefit system can lead high unemployment if there is no mandate for actively 
looking for job and activation interventions are not sufficient. High level of unionization for 
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collective wage bargaining also could increase unemployment if there is no coordination among 
either employers or unions in wage bargaining. A significant total tax burden on workers also is 
mentioned as the reason for high unemployment. Nickel (1997) suggests that high level of 
minimum wages hurts young people in terms of being unemployed. Additionally, poor 
educational outcome for lowest end of the labor market is found as a reason for high 
unemployment. Nickell (1997) argues that the impacts of labor market rigidities like strict 
employment protection legislation on average level of unemployment is not significant. Nickell 
& Layard (1999) find no evidence on the relationship between higher labor market rigidities and 
high unemployment rate. They, also, argue that more strict employment legislations diminish the 
labor turnover.  Pissarides (2001) constructs a theoretical model to analyze the role of 
employment protection in job creation. He shows that optimally chosen severance pay and 
advance notice of termination play an insurance role and do not reduce job creation with an 
exogenous unemployment insurance system. Bassani & Duval (2009) find that the relationship 
between aggregate unemployment rate and EPL is not conclusive. In their study, institutional 
determinants of unemployment are unemployment generosity measure, EPL, union membership 
rates, and the measure of centralization/coordination of wage bargaining. Output gap also is used 
in order to proxy business cycle fluctuations. They find that while tax wedge and average 
replacement rate are positively associated with unemployment rates, EPL and union density are 
not significant determinants of the unemployment rate. Output gap and high corporatism are 
found to reduce the unemployment rate.  
In conclusion, the findings on the relationship between the unemployment rate and 
employment protection legislation are mixed as Skedinger (2010) concludes after an extensive 
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review of literature on this topic. No robust relationship between aggregate employment, or 
unemployment, and employment protection persists.   
 
IV. Model 
 
In a country, economic growth, the structure of the economy, the role of the government 
on the economy, the education system building the labor force, labor market regulations 
including labor tax, employment protection legislations, unemployment benefit systems, 
minimum wages, and unions are key factors affecting the labor market outcomes such as the 
employment rate and the unemployment rate. A static fixed effect regression model and dynamic 
panel regression techniques are used in this study to analyze the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the employment protection index in the selected OECD countries. 
In the static regression, the effect of labor market legislations on the unemployment rate 
is analyzed through following reduced regression forms 
(1)   ittiitititit zEPIUnemp   10 , 
where unemp is the unemployment rate for country i at year t, i is the country fixed effects, and 
t is the year fixed effects, itz is  a vector of control variables, which includes output gap, 
openness, share of industrial output, population density, urbanization rate, real hourly minimum 
wage, size of government measured by the general government expenditure in GDP, net 
unemployment benefit replacement rate measuring generosity of unemployment benefit system, 
and average personnel income tax rates. This specification is similar to the specification used in 
Verdugo et al. (2012) but adds average tax wedge and unemployment benefit generosity 
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following the guidance of Di Tella & MacCulloch (2005), Bassanin & Duval (2006), and Nickel 
(1997).  
Changes in the unemployment rate also can cause policy makers to change employment 
protection legislations to address the adverse developments in the labor market, and therefore, 
unemployment rate. In such cases, the direction of causality from the unemployment rate to 
employment protection legislations creates the endogeneity problem in regression estimations. 
To address the endogeneity issue, a dynamic reduced form equation is estimated by using a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.
6
  
(2)  itititititit zEPIUnempUnemp    2110 , 
where unemp is the unemployment rate for country i at year t, itz is  a vector of control  variables 
listed above. 
 
V. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
The existing data from the OECD statistical data base do not include all the analysis 
variables needed to estimate the models described in the previous section. Therefore, I combined 
the data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, the World Economic 
Outlook of the IMF, and the OECD statistical database.  
 
Data 
 
The Employment Protection Index, which is produced by the OECD, is the key data 
measuring the strictness of the labor market regulations. This data measures the procedures and 
costs related to dismissal of a group or individuals in addition to the procedures for hiring 
                                                 
6
 Similar to the dynamic panel model estimated in Verdugo et al. (2012). 
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workers with fixed-term or temporary contracts.
7
 The EPI index is a summary measure of three 
different employment protection indicators. The first indicator measures the relative difference 
across countries of individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, which include 
procedural inconveniences when firing a worker such as notification and consultation 
requirements, severance pay and notice periods. The second aspect is about the regulations 
governing temporary contracts with respect to duration and the types of work under these 
contracts. This measure also incorporates the information on rules and regulations on 
establishment and operation of temporary work agencies and conditions causing higher costs of 
temporary contracts in comparison to hiring workers on permanent contracts. The last aspect is 
the additional costs burdens on employers due to collective dismissals (CD). This measure 
covers costs for collective firing in case there are any additional costs compared to costs 
associated with individual dismissals. For example, one of the sub-components of the CD 
measures whether or not there are additional notification requirements to some organizations like 
labor unions in comparison to individual dismissal cases. This score, for instance, is 1.5 for 
Portugal and 6 for the Slovak Republic. Therefore, the Slovak Republic is stricter in terms of the 
additional requirement for the notification of collective dismissal. 
The OECD calculates three versions of overall summary indicators by using weighted 
and unweighted averages of these sub-indicators.
8
 In this study, the unweighted average of the 
sub-indicators for regular contracts and temporary contracts is used as it is available over 1985-
2008. Another version is the weighted sum of three sub-indicators, and it is available over 1998-
                                                 
7
 Venn (2009) notes that employment protection is one of the policies influencing labor market flexibility. 
Therefore, EPI is not complete measure of labor market flexibility. For example, it does not include the measure of 
unionization, working hours, part-time contracts and social protection programs. 
8
 See Table 2A in Appendices for more information on the detailed categorization of the overall summary indices. 
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2008. The last version of the summary indicator includes new data items, and it is available only 
for 2008. 
9
 
Unemployment rate, the ratio of total unemployed and total labor force, is the dependent 
variable of the model estimated in this study. It is compiled by the OECD using member 
countries’ labor force statistics.10 Unemployment data cover the civilian population above 15 
years-old. People can be identified as unemployed under the following conditions: i) he or she 
does not have paid or unpaid work; ii) he or she is available for work; or iii) he or she is actively 
looking for a job.
11
 The unemployed person faces various labor market choices. He or she can 
find a job and therefore his status changes from unemployed to employed. Alternatively, if the 
unemployed cannot find a job or does not accept a job offer for various reasons, then his 
unemployed status does not change. Lastly, the unemployed would leave the labor market if he 
stops looking for a job. This could result from discouragement of long-term unemployment, or 
availability of more attractive options outside of the labor market (Shimer, 2011).  
Control Variables 
In order to isolate the impact of EPL on the unemployment rate, some other factors 
influencing the unemployment rate are controlled in this study. The controls are output gap, 
government expenditure as a share of GDP, openness of the economy, real hourly minimum 
wages, share of industry in total economy, population, population density, net unemployment 
benefit replacement rate, and average tax wedge.   
                                                 
9
 A more detailed description of the employment protection index can be obtained from following website of the 
OECD: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm#details 
10
 The data is extracted from the OECD on 08 Oct 2012 14:43 UTC (GMT) 
11
The detailed definition of unemployed can be obtained from following website of the OECD 
http://stats.oecd.org/metadata/publish.asp?ds=1&co=.lfun....... 
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The output gap measures the level of economic activity relative to potential of the 
economy. It is calculated as actual GDP minus potential GDP as a percent of potential GDP.
12
 
These data produced by the IMF are available for 23 OECD countries in World Economic 
Outlook (September 2012).Government expenditure as a share of GDP measures the size of 
government activities in the economy. Openness, which is the share of total export and import in 
GDP, is used as a measure of openness of the economy. Real hourly minimum wages is available 
for 24 OECD countries from the OECD database. Nominal wages were first deflated by the 
national consumer price index, and then converted into a common currency unit using US $ 
current exchange rates. Share of industry in the total economy is the total industrial value added 
as a share of GDP measures the sector structure of the economy. This data is received from the 
World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank. 
Population measures main demographic trends in the economies, and it is a crucial 
determinant of labor supply. Population density is the number of people per square km of land 
area in a country. Urbanization rate is the ratio of urban population to total population. This 
variable measures the modernization level of the country. The data of these three demographic 
variables are WDI database of the World Bank.    
Net unemployment benefit replacement rate measures the generosity of unemployment 
benefit systems in OECD countries. It is defined as the average of the net unemployment benefit 
(including social assistance and cash housing assistance) replacement rates for two earnings 
levels, three family situations and 60 months of unemployment. The data, which are produced by 
the OECD, are available between 2001 and 2010 (OECD, 2012d).  Average tax wedge is used in 
order to capture the impact of labor costs on unemployment. Tax wedge is defined as “the 
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 Paula R. De Masi (1997) discusses the methodologies of potential output calculation. 
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difference between total labor costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of 
the employee as  a percentage of total labor costs” (Paturot, Mellbye & Brys, 2013, p.8). 
Average tax wedge is the summation of the income tax, social security contribution of employee 
and employer, and any payroll tax if it is applicable.
13
. In the analysis, average tax wedge of one-
earner married couple at 100% of average earnings, 2 children is used. The data are produced by 
the OECD.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this study, the relationship between employment protection legislation and the 
unemployment rate is analyzed for 15 OECD countries over 2001-2008. Table 1 and 2 provide 
descriptive statistics of the unemployment rate, the employment protection index as well as 
control variables. The average of the mean unemployment rate of 15 OECD countries over 2001-
2008 is 6.7 percent with a standard deviation of 3. The average of mean employment protection 
index over 2001-2008 is 3.5 with a standard deviation of 0.9. Portugal has the most strict labor 
market in the sample, whereas the U.S. has the most flexible employment protection legislation. 
Openness measure, which is the share of total trade in GDP, suggests that 15 OECD countries 
are open economies as trade accounts for 80.1 percent of GDP.  There is significant variation in 
real minimum wage among the selected countries. The highest average real minimum wage is 
10.5 US dollars per hour in Australia and the lowest average real minimum wage is 1.4 US 
dollars per hour in the Slovak Republic. Population also appears to vary substantially among the 
countries in the sample. For example, 2.6 people live in Australia per square kilometer of land on 
average over 2001-2008, in contrast to 496.8 in South Korea. As most of the countries in the 
                                                 
13
 Following website of the OECD is helpful for the information on average tax wedge: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-
policy/ 
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sample are developed countries, the urbanization rate is quite high but shows considerable 
variation. The average of countries’ mean urbanization rates is 76.5 percent during the 2001-
2008 periods. 
The observed output gap across the sample was positive on average during the analysis 
period of the study. Other than Japan and South Korea, all the remaining countries have positive 
output gap. The size of the government varies substantially among 15 OECD countries. France 
has the biggest share of the government expenditures in GDP with more than 50 per cent; on the 
other hand South Korea has the lowest share with 20.6 per cent. Unemployment generosity 
measured by net unemployment benefit (UB) replacement rate varies within the sample. The 
U.S. has the least generous unemployment benefit system with 27.9 percent net UB replacement 
rate, whereas European countries have more generous unemployment benefit system. For 
example, the average net UB replacement rate in the Netherlands is 68.5 percent. Average tax 
wedge rates vary within the sample. France has the highest average tax wedge with 41.5 percent; 
while, Ireland has the lowest average tax wedge with 6.3 percent.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2001-2008: First Set of Variables 
 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) EPI 
(Trade 
/GDP (%) 
Real Hourly 
Minimum 
Wages-US 
Dollar 
Population 
Density (people 
per sq. km of 
land) 
      Australia 5.4 1.2 40.5 10.5 2.6 
Belgium 7.7 2.2 155.4 10.0 344.0 
Canada 6.9 0.8 73.0 6.6 3.5 
Spain 10.2 3.0 57.8 4.1 86.3 
France 8.5 3.1 53.9 10.1 114.9 
United Kingdom 5.0 0.7 56.4 9.9 248.6 
Greece 9.4 2.9 56.3 4.7 86.0 
Ireland 4.6 1.1 158.7 9.5 60.0 
Japan 4.6 1.4 27.0 5.8 350.2 
Korea 3.5 2.0 77.9 3.1 496.8 
Netherlands 3.9 2.1 131.2 9.7 482.1 
New Zealand 4.4 1.5 60.0 7.0 15.6 
Portugal 6.6 3.5 67.5 2.9 114.7 
Slovak Republic 15.5 1.5 160.2 1.4 112.0 
United States 5.3 0.2 26.1 6.2 32.1 
Min. 3.5 0.2 26.1 1.4 2.6 
Max. 15.5 3.5 160.2 10.5 496.8 
Mean 6.7 1.8 80.1 6.5 170.0 
St. Dev. 3.0 0.9 45.5 2.9 164.8 
Source: Unemployment rate, EPI, real hourly minimum wage is from OECD Employment and 
Labor Statistics (OECD, 2012b).  Share of trade in GDP (Trade/GDP) and population density is 
from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for 2001-2008: Second Set of Variables 
 
Urbanization 
Rates (%) 
Output Gap 
in Percent 
of Potential 
GDP (%) 
General 
Government 
Total 
Expenditure 
of GDP (%) 
Net 
Unemployment 
Benefit 
Replacement 
Rate (%) 
Average Tax 
Wedge (%) 
      Australia 88.1 0.1 34.5 49.9 17.4 
Belgium 97.3 0.5 49.7 62.9 41.4 
Canada 80.0 1.2 40.1 45.5 21.2 
Spain 76.7 1.7 39.0 50.3 32.9 
France 80.9 0.1 53.0 57.6 41.5 
United Kingdom 79.0 2.4 39.8 51.3 27.2 
Greece 60.3 3.5 46.1 32.2 36.3 
Ireland 60.4 1.9 34.4 65.7 6.3 
Japan 84.8 -1.0 35.1 58.3 23.9 
Korea 81.2 -0.2 20.6 36.3 16.4 
Netherlands 79.7 0.4 45.8 68.5 29.1 
New Zealand 86.0 1.2 30.3 56.2 9.4 
Portugal 57.2 0.6 44.5 57.3 27.7 
Slovak Republic 55.6 0.3 38.9 50.1 26.9 
United States 80.5 0.7 36.3 27.9 18.1 
Min. 55.6 -1.0 20.6 27.9 6.3 
Max. 97.3 3.5 53.0 68.5 41.5 
Mean 76.5 0.9 39.2 51.3 25.0 
St. Dev. 11.9 1.1 7.8 11.4 10.2 
Source: Urbanization rates from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Output gap in percent of 
potential GDP and general government total expenditure as a share of GDP are from the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook (September 2012). Net real hourly minimum wage is from OECD Employment and Labor Statistics.  Net 
UI replacement rate is from OECD Benefits and Wages Statistics (OECD, 2012d). Average tax wedge is from 
OECD Tax Statistics (OECD, 2012e).  
 
 
VI. Regression Results 
The impact of labor market regulations on the unemployment rate in the selected OECD 
countries is analyzed through the fixed effects regression model. Fixed effects technique allows 
controlling for observed and unobserved country characteristics that do not change over time. 
Other determinants of the unemployment rate are also included in the model. I first discuss the 
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results of the static fixed effects regression estimation and GMM dynamic panel data estimation, 
and then perform several robustness checks.
14
   
The results of the fixed effects estimations and GMM dynamic panel data estimation are 
presented in Table 3. The first three regressions are performed by using the fixed effects 
regression model controlling for the country fixed effects.
15
 The first three regressions show the 
fixed effects regression of the static model for different specifications. The last regression 
(Model 4) in Table 3 is the output of the GMM dynamic panel estimation which accounts for 
endogeneity (or reverse causality) of the explanatory variables. In the GMM dynamic panel 
estimation, population density and openness are considered as exogenous variables, and all other 
variables are treated as endogenous.
16
 The main finding in these regression results is that EPI 
does not have a statistically significant association with the unemployment rate for the selected 
15 OECD countries. Dynamic panel estimation of EPI coefficient is consistent with the fixed 
effect estimations. Although there is a difference in magnitude, both regression results suggest a 
statistically not significant relationship between EPI and the unemployment rate. The negative 
EPI coefficient implies that stricter employment protection legislation is related with a lower 
unemployment rate. These findings are consistent with Bassani & Duval (2009) who also find a 
negative but not significant relationship between EPI and unemployment rates.  
Model 1 of the fixed effects regression, including all the control variables in Table 3, 
suggests that a one unit increase in the employment protection index is associated with 0.55 unit 
                                                 
14
 Correlation matrix of the all variables in the model is in the Table A3 in Appendix. 
15
 Time fixed effect is not presented as joint F-test because the time dummies are not significant at conventional 
significance levels. Furthermore, autocorrelation also is taken into account for the models by including first-order 
auto regressive disturbance terms in the model. Share of industrial output dropped from the estimation because of 
high collinearity with openness variable. 
16
 The GMM-system regression is estimated by using the Stata command developed by Roodman (2009). 
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decrease in unemployment rates on average after controlling for all other variables and country 
fixed effects. Stricter employment legislation, theoretically, discourages both hiring and firing 
(Heckman & Pages-Serra, 2000). The EPI coefficient is expected to be negative if employers are 
inclined to restrict firing more than hiring when job security legislations become stricter. For 
example, Bentolila & Berola (1990) suggest that firing costs have larger impacts on firms for 
firing in comparison to hiring. In Model 1, some of the explanatory variables are found to be 
individually insignificant. In order to investigate whether these variables are jointly significant, a 
joint F test is performed. After performing a joint F test, minimum wage, the interaction of 
minimum wage and EPI, population density and urban population are all dropped from the 
model. After dropping these variables, Model 2 is estimated. There are no substantial differences 
between the coefficients in Model 1 and Model2. This finding suggests that the contribution of 
the dropped variables from Model 1 to Model 2 to explain the unemployment rate is negligible. 
Model 2 suggests that EPI is negatively associated with unemployment rate. After controlling 
country fixed effects and other explanatory variables, a one unit increase in EPI is associated 
with 0.6 unit decrease in unemployment rates (see Model 2 in Table 3). However, the coefficient 
of EPI is not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Openness of the 
economy, output gap, and government size are the only significant variables in both Model 1 and 
Model 2.  
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Table 3: Determinants of Unemployment Rate in Models 1 to 4 
 
     
Variables Model 1 (FE) Model 2 (FE) Model 3 (FE) Model 4 (GMM) 
     
Lag Unemp    0.848*** 
    (0.0427) 
EPI -0.551 -0.648  -0.0534 
 (0.915) (0.789)  (0.0884) 
Lag EPI   -1.520*  
   (0.834)  
Openness -0.0533*** -0.0405*** -0.0375*** 0.000650 
 (0.0198) (0.0148) (0.0142) (0.00292) 
Minimum Wage -0.166   -0.0677* 
 (0.271)   (0.0343) 
Epi*Minimum Wage -0.0987    
 (0.158)    
Urbanization Rate 0.256   0.000408 
 (0.291)   (0.00677) 
Population Density 0.0642   -0.000471 
 (0.118)   (0.000710) 
Output Gap -0.157** -0.187*** -0.205*** -0.103*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0584) (0.0580) (0.0339) 
Government Size 0.164*** 0.136** 0.109* 0.0436** 
 (0.0608) (0.0570) (0.0559) -0.00317 
Un. Replacement Rate -0.0711* -0.0611* -0.0337 (0.0128) 
 (0.0361) (0.0346) (0.0371) -0.00914 
Tax Wedge 0.0321 0.0214 0.0212 (0.0185) 
 (0.0380) (0.0374) (0.0365) -0.465 
Constant -19.86** 8.288*** 9.342*** (0.956) 
 (9.342) (0.864) (0.769) -0.00317 
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  
     
Year Fixed Effect No No No  
N 105 105 105 120 
Hansen Test (p-value)    1.00 
Arellano-bond AR(2) test 
(p-value) 
   0.957 
R-squared 0.35 0.31 0.33  
Number of country 15 15 15 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Determinants of Unemployment Rate in Models 5 and 6 
 
   
Variables Model (5) Model (6) 
   
EPI -1.297*  
 (0.671)  
Lag EPI  -1.465** 
  (0.707) 
Openness -0.0469*** -0.0422*** 
  (0.0126) 
Output Gap -0.156*** -0.174*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0451) 
Government Size 0.121** 0.100** 
 (0.0466) (0.0468) 
Un. Replacement Rate -0.0461 -0.0262 
 (0.0284) (0.0294) 
Tax Wedge 0.00302 0.00383 
 (0.0368) (0.0367) 
Constant 10.15*** 9.907*** 
 (0.793) (0.737) 
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
   
Year Fixed Effect No No 
N 154 154 
R-squared 0.31 0.32 
Number of country 22 22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Model 2 (Table 3) suggests that a one unit increase in the output gap is associated with a 
0.19 unit decline in the unemployment rate after controlling for other variables and country fixed 
characteristics. Negative association between the output gap and the unemployment rate is 
consistently significant across the model specifications presented here. This finding also is 
consistent with previous studies in the literature [e.g. Bassani & Duval (2009), and Bernal-
Verdugo et al. (2012)]. Government size, measured by the share of total government 
expenditures in GDP, is positively associated with the unemployment rate in all models. A one 
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unit increase in government size, in Model 2, is associated with a 0.14 unit increase in the 
unemployment rate after controlling for other variables and country fixed characteristics. The 
result also is consistent with some of the earlier studies [e.g. Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012) and 
Feldman (2006)]. This study does not find a significant positive relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the average net replacement rate of the unemployment benefit. It is 
possible to have higher unemployment rate as unemployment benefit systems becoming more 
generous [e.g. Nickell (1997)]. People would tend to stay more in unemployment if their 
reservation wage increases with a more generous unemployment benefit system.
17
 The average 
tax wedge, which measures total costs of labor including social security payments by employee 
and employer, personnel income tax and payroll tax, is found to be not a statistically significant. 
The sign of the tax wedge coefficient is consistent with the previous studies [e.g. Bassani & 
Duval (2009)], and these studies generally find a positive relationship between tax wedge and 
unemployment rate. 
The GMM dynamic panel estimation (Model 4) suggests that output gap and government 
size are significant variables; however openness is not significant. Although real minimum wage 
is not significant in the fixed effect regressions, it becomes significant in the GMM estimation 
(Model 4). Model 1 and Model 4 find an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate 
and real minimum wage. A one dollar increase in the real minimum wage is related with 0.06 
point decline in the unemployment rate (see Model 4 in Table 3). Theoretically, an increase in 
minimum wage could cause an increase in unemployment rate under various assumptions. 
However, this finding depends on certain assumptions on the characteristics of labor demand and 
                                                 
17
 Solon (1985) shows that a decrease in unemployment benefits reduces the average unemployment duration among 
high income unemployment insurance beneficiaries.   
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supply, such as elasticity as well as general equilibrium effects of real minimum wage 
increases.
18
 For example, Card and Krueger (1995) did not find significant impact of minimum 
wage on employment rates.  
To test the robustness of the static fixed effects regressions, I, first, included the lagged 
EPI in the model (Model 3 in Table 3). Any change in employment protection legislations may 
have an impact on the unemployment rate with a time lag. The estimated EPI coefficient still is 
negative in this specification but becomes significant only at the 10 percent level. The magnitude 
of the lag of EPI coefficient in Model 3 is larger than the EPI coefficients in Model 1 and in 
Model 2.
19
 In this study, the sample size is restricted by data availability. As several variables, 
minimum wage, interaction of minimum wage and EPI, population density and urban population, 
are dropped from the Model 1, more countries are included in the sample in Model 5 and Model 
6 (see Table 4). These aforementioned variables are dropped as their contribution to explain the 
dependent variable is negligible. When the regression analysis is extended from 15 OECD 
countries to 22 OECD countries in Model 5 and Model 6, the findings do not change. After 
controlling country fixed effects and other explanatory variables, the EPI coefficient is -1.30 and 
significant at the 1 percent level (Model 5 in Table 4). Also, openness of the economy, 
government size and output gap are still the significant variables. The net unemployment benefit 
replacement rate and tax wedge are not significant at conventional levels.  
In general, I find that employment protection legislations are not a significant 
determinant of the unemployment rate after controlling country fixed characteristics and other 
economic factors. On the other hand, I find that, on average, output gap and government size are 
                                                 
18
 Neumark & Wascher (2007) discuss the minimum wages and employment by providing broad literature review. 
19
 The findings of the dynamic panel model including the lagged EPI are similar to those in Model 4. 
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significant factors affecting the unemployment rate under various specifications tested in this 
study. Demographic variables, such as population density and the urbanization rate, are found to 
be not significant factors. Contrary findings in the literature, generosity of unemployment 
benefits and tax wedge are found to be not significant in explaining variation in unemployment 
rates among the 15 OECD countries. Some caveats should be emphasized before the policy 
implications of the analysis. First, the employment protection index is a composite index of the 
regulations, but does not measure enforcement of these regulations. Stricter employment 
protection could lead to an increase in informal employment which creates duality in the labor 
market. Because of duality in the labor market, more strict employment protection may not have 
an impact on the official aggregate unemployment rate but it could encourage informal 
employment. For example, Kugler (1999) shows that liberalization of labor market regulation 
through reduction in severance payments cause a reallocation from informal sector to formal 
employment in Colombia. Therefore, for countries with high informal employment, the 
reallocation impact of the policy change could be significant. Another issue is the small sample 
size. In this study, not all OECD countries were included in the analysis for a longer time period 
because of the data availability. The 15 OECD countries are selected based on the availability of 
key variables. After dropping the insignificant variables, the sample size becomes larger and the 
model results remain consistent. Thus, the small sample size is not considered as setback.     
 
VII. Policy Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The cross-country panel data estimations described in this study suggests that, on 
average, employment protection legislations are not significant determinants of higher 
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unemployment rates. Therefore, EPL reforms may not have the impacts of various policy 
recommendations suggested by the OECD (1994) on unemployment rates. On the other hand, 
output gap and government size are significant determinants of unemployment rates across the 
15 OECD countries. The output gap measuring the business cycle fluctuations of aggregate 
demand is a major determinant of the unemployment rates. Therefore, reducing the output gap 
through macroeconomic policies like aggregate demand management appears to be a more viable 
strategy for reducing unemployment. Furthermore, as the government receives a higher share of 
total output, unemployment rates tend to increase on average. Higher government expenditures 
would crowd-out job creating private investments, and therefore unemployment rates, on 
average, could increase as governments expenditures rise (Feldmann, 2006). Generosity of 
unemployment benefits and tax wedge are not found to be significant in explaining heterogeneity 
in unemployment rates, which contradicts the common finding that generous unemployment 
benefits cause higher unemployment rate (e.g. Nickell (1997)). A higher tax wedge also is found 
to be not significant. Findings of this study suggest that policy makers, especially in developed 
countries, should focus on the primary goal of employment protection legislations: insuring a 
worker against unexpected job loss through employment protection policies rather than 
unemployment impacts of the EPL reform.  
Employment protection legislation could affect other labor market outcomes like the 
employment rate. Future studies analyzing the relationship between the employment rate and the 
employment protection index would contribute to literature by using up-to-date data set.  
Furthermore, employment protection legislations would have different implications in the case of 
developing countries. For example, stricter employment protection legislations would be cause 
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of high informal employment. The future studies analyzing the impact of employment protection 
legislations on informality in developing countries would also contribute to the literature.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Table A1: Employment Protection Index in 2008* 
  Protection of permanent 
workers against 
(individual) dismissal 
Regulation on 
temporary forms 
of employment 
Specific 
requirements for 
collective dismissal 
OECD 
employment 
protection index 
Overall 
Ranking 
Australia 1.37 0.79 2.88 1.38 27 
Austria 2.19 2.29 3.25 2.41 13 
Belgium 1.94 2.67 4.13 2.61 11 
Canada 1.17 0.22 2.63 1.02 30 
Chile 2.59 2.04 0.00 1.93 22 
China 3.31 2.21 3.00 2.80 8 
Czech Republic 3.00 1.71 2.13 2.32 15 
Denmark 1.53 1.79 3.13 1.91 23 
Finland 2.38 2.17 2.38 2.29 16 
France 2.60 3.75 2.13 3.00 5 
Germany 2.85 1.96 3.75 2.63 10 
Greece 2.28 3.54 3.25 2.97 6 
Hungary 1.82 2.08 2.88 2.11 20 
Ireland 1.67 0.71 2.38 1.39 26 
Italy 1.69 2.54 4.88 2.58 12 
Japan 2.05 1.50 1.50 1.73 25 
Korea 2.29 2.08 1.88 2.13 18 
Luxembourg 2.68 3.92 3.88 3.39 2 
Mexico 2.25 4.00 3.75 3.23 3 
Netherlands 2.73 1.42 3.00 2.23 17 
New Zealand 1.54 1.08 0.38 1.16 28 
Norway 2.20 3.00 2.88 2.65 9 
Poland 2.01 2.33 3.63 2.41 14 
Portugal 3.51 2.54 1.88 2.84 7 
Slovak Republic 2.45 1.17 3.75 2.13 19 
Spain 2.38 3.83 3.13 3.11 4 
Sweden 2.72 0.71 3.75 2.06 21 
Switzerland 1.19 1.50 3.88 1.77 24 
Turkey 2.48 4.88 2.38 3.46 1 
United Kingdom 1.17 0.29 2.88 1.09 29 
United States 0.56 0.33 2.88 0.85 31 
Source: OECD (2012c).  
* For France and Portugal, 2009 data is used. Version 3 of the indicator is used here and it is explained in 
data section. 
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Table A2: Overall Summary of Employment Protection Index   
  Overall Summary Indicator (Unweighted Average of (A) and (B)) (0-6) 
  Regular Contracts (A)     Temporary Contracts (B) 
Variable 
Sub-indicator for dismissal of 
employees on regular 
contracts - calculated as 
weighted sum of items 
relating to regular contracts 
(REG1-REG8). 
  Variable 
Sub-indicator for strictness of 
regulation on temporary contracts - 
calculated as weighted sum of 
items relating to temporary 
contracts (FTC1-FTC3; TWA1-
TWA3). 
REG1 Notification procedures   FTC1 
Valid cases for use of fixed-term 
contracts 
REG2 
Delay involved before notice 
can start 
  FTC2 
Maximum number of successive 
fixed-term contracts 
REG3A 
Length of notice period at 9 
months of tenure 
  FTC3 
Maximum cumulated duration of 
successive fixed-term contracts 
REG3B 
Length of notice period at 4 
years of tenure 
  TWA1 
Types of work from which 
temporary work agency 
employment is legal 
REG3C 
Length of notice period at 20 
years of tenure 
  TWA2 
Restrictions on number of renewals 
of temporary work agency 
contracts 
REG4A 
Severance pay at 9 months of 
tenure 
  TWA3 
Maximum cumulated duration of 
successive temporary work agency 
contracts 
REG4B 
Severance pay at 4 years of 
tenure 
      
REG4C 
Severance pay at 20 years of 
tenure 
      
REG5 
Definition of justified or 
unfair dismissal 
      
REG6 Length of trial period       
REG7 
Compensation following 
unfair dismissal 
      
REG8 
Possibility of reinstatement 
following unfair dismissal 
      
Source: OECD. For more information, see www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
30 
 
Table A3: Correlation Matrix of Model Variables 
 
 
UR Epi Openness 
Minimum 
Wage 
Urbanization 
Rate 
Population 
Density 
Output 
Gap 
Government 
Size 
UI 
Replacement 
Rate 
Av. 
Income 
Tax 
Rate 
UR 1 
         
Epi 0.2883* 1 
        
 
Openness 
0.2570* 0.0267 1 
       
 
Minimum Wage 
-0.4223* 
-
0.2460* 
0.0596 1 
      
 
Population Density 
-0.2987* 0.1563 0.2469* 0.0356 1 
     
 
Urbanization Rate 
-0.4276* 
-
0.2508* 
-
0.2507* 
0.5212* 0.2854* 1 
    
 
Output Gap 
-0.0391 -0.0137 0.0444 0.128 -0.2152* -0.2154* 1 
   
 
Government Size 
0.3888* 0.4400* 0.1599 0.3049* -0.0758 -0.0653 0.109 1 
  
 
UI Replacement 
Rate 
-0.0507 0.1941* 0.4612* 0.3832* 0.2325* 0.1008 -0.1301 0.3376* 1 
 
Av. Income Tax 
Rate 
0.4669* 0.5969* 0.0381 0.0033 0.2259* 0.0713 0.0313 0.7703* 0.0878 1 
* p<0.05 
3
0
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